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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the Tax Commission's decision to dismiss Arco 
Electric's (Arco's)Petition for failure to attend the status 
conference supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light 
of the whole record before the Court? The standard of review 
requires the Court to examine the record for "such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support 
a conclusion." R.10-13 Harken Southwest Corp. v. Board of Oil Gas 
and Mining, 920 P.2d 1176, 1180 (Utah 1996); Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-16(g). 
2. Whether, assuming the agency's action in dismissing Arco's 
Petition is supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light 
of the whole record before the court, such dismissal was arbitrary, 
capricious, or unconstitutional, as it has been applied. R. 10-13. 
To the extent that the decision is one based on constitution-
ally, the review of the agency's decision is done solely for 
correctness. Elks Lodge's #719 (Ogden) and #2021 (Moab) v. 
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 905 P.2d 1189, 1193 (Utah 
1995) . To determine if the actions of the Tax Commission consti-
tute an abuse of discretion, or if they were arbitrary and 
capricious; this Court will evaluate them subject to an intermedi-
ate type of review which requires the Appellate Court to affirm the 
agency action if it was reasonable and rational. See SEMENCQ 
Industries, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax 
Commission, 849 P.2d 1167, 1173-74 (Utah 1993). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the final Order of the Utah State Tax 
Commission, dated March 7, 1997, dismissing Arco's Petition for 
Redetermination. Jurisdiction was originally proper in the Utah 
Supreme Court, pursuant to U.C.A., §78-2-2 (3) (e) (ii) , and it is 
proper in this Court pursuant to the pour over provisions as 
contained in Utah Code Annotated, §78-2-2(4). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
The determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules in this case are cited below and are reproduced herein as 
Addendum B. 
U.S. Const. Amend XIV 
Utah Const. Art. 2 §7 
U.C.A. §59-1-504 (1953 as amended) 
U.C.A. §63-46b-8 (1953 as amended) 
U.C.A. §63-46b-ll (1953 as amended) 
U.C.A. §63-46b-16 (1953 as amended) 
U.C.A. §78-2-2 (1953 as amended) 
Utah Admin Code R. 8 61-1A-1 
Utah Admin Code R. 861-1A-3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was commenced with a filing of a Petition for 
Redetermination challenging two separate assessments made by the 
Utah State Tax Commission's Auditing Division for alleged 
deficiencies in the collection of sales tax. R. 39-41. 
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The two matters were designated as Account Nos. GO3708 and 
GO2500. R. 39. As the issues raised in the two petitions were 
identical to issues already being pursued by the Tax Commission in 
other formal proceedings and before the Utah Supreme Court, the 
parties stipulated to a stay of this case until the other appeals 
were decided. R. 35; R. 11; Addendum C l . 
The issues in the appeal on Account No. GO2500 were determined 
by the Utah Supreme Court in the favor of Arco. Arco Electric v. 
Utah State Tax Commission, 860 P.2d 330 (Utah 1993) . Subsequently, 
the Auditing Division amended its assessment to zero, and that 
portion of the Petition was dismissed by the Administrative Law 
Judge. Addendum D. 
The remaining issue in the petition, was an assessment for 
sales tax which allegedly should have been procured from Pepcon for 
work and materials provided by Arco on the construction of the 
Pepcon facility in Cedar City, Utah. R. 11. The Tax Commission had 
also begun proceedings directly against Pepcon alleging the failure 
to pay the sales tax as required. Addendum C. 
While waiting in that posture, the Administrative Law Judge 
scheduled a status conference, and notice was purportedly sent to 
Arco, Arco's counsel and the Attorney General's Office. R.23. The 
1
 In reviewing the record for this appeal, Arco's counsel 
discovered the record is incomplete. The Tax Commission has 
created two separate files, one for case 93-0237 and one for case 
93-0337. Pleadings, correspondence and Orders directly relating to 
this case are contained in the file for 93-0337, which has not been 
designated a part of the record by the Tax Commission. Arco has 
copied those parts of that file it believes are relevant to this 
appeal and reproduced them herein at Addendums C and D. 
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mailing certificate shows notice of the conference was not sent to 
Arco, but to the former address of Arcofs counsel. The mailing 
certificate does purport the Notice was sent to Arco 's counsel. 
Arco's counsel did not receive the Notice allegedly sent. R. 
10. Accordingly, no one appeared at the scheduling conference on 
behalf of Arco. R. 20. An Order of Default was entered on 
11/27/96. R. 20. Arco filed a request for reconsideration with the 
Utah State Tax Commission. R. 10. That request was denied. R. 4. 
A Petition for Review of Order was filed with the Utah Supreme 
Court on April 17, 1997. R. 3. 
The following facts are relevant to the issues presented to 
the Court for this review. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Following audits by the Auditing Division of the Utah 
State Tax Commission in 1992, assessments were made against Arco. 
R. 39-41. 
2. Those assessments showed up under two separate account 
numbers, GO3 708 and GO2500. R. 39. 
3. Arco Electric filed a Petition for Redetermination 
challenging the assessments under the two account numbers. R.39-
41. The combined appeals were assigned the case number 920237 and 
it was under that number that the Auditing Division responded to 
the initial Petition for Redetermination. R. 35. 
4. The issues relating to account number GO3708 were 
identical to the issues which Arco had before the Utah Supreme 
Court in Case Number 920182. R.35 
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5. The parties agreed to stay further action on those issues, 
pending a decision by the Court. Addendum C. 
6. In a decision, dated September 22, 1993, the Court ruled 
in favor of Arco on the issues present under account number GO3708. 
Arco Electric v. Utah State Tax Commission, 860 P.2d 330 (Utah 
1993) . 
7. Arco's counsel contacted the Utah Attorney Generalf s 
Office and requested a dismissal with respect to the issues 
contained in account number GO3708, but the Attorney General's 
Office declined. Subsequently, the Auditing Division amended its 
assessment under that account number to zero, and the matter was 
ultimately dismissed by Administrative Law Judge, Gail S. Reich. 
Addendum D. 
8. Account number GO2500 involves issues relating to 
materials and services provided at the Pepcon facility in Cedar 
City, Utah. R. 11. 
9. The Auditing Division made a similar assessment against 
Pepcon directly, and Pepcon filed a Petition for Redetermination on 
that issue. Addendum C. 
10. In a Pre-hearing Order on November 23, 1993, A.L.J. Alan 
Henebold ruled that the appeals on both cases were to be held in 
abeyance until the other appeals were decided. Addendum C. 
11. As of this date, counsel for Arco has not received a 
written communication identifying the resolution of the Pepcon 
appeal. R. 11. 
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12. Arco's counsel has received verbal information that the 
Pepcon matter has been resolved. R. 11. 
13. To confirm that information, Arco's counsel sent a letter 
to the Attorney General's Office asking for information relating to 
the outcome of the assessment, but no such information was 
forthcoming except for an oral statement that the matter had been 
settled. R.ll 
14. Administrative Law Judge Gail S. Reich, decided to hold 
a status conference in the fall of 1996. R. 23. 
15. A notice of the Status Conference was allegedly sent to 
counsel for Arco at his office. R.23. 
16. Counsel for Arco did not receive a copy of the Notice of 
Status Conference. R.10. 
17. A Notice of Status Conference was allegedly sent to 
Arco, but the address used was the former office address of Arco 's 
counsel, not Arco's address. R. 23. 
18. The Tax Commission knew the address it mailed the Notice 
to, for Arco, was not Arco's address. See Addendum D pg. 3. 
19. Arco did not receive a copy of the Notice of Status 
Conference. R.ll. 
20. Arco's counsel first became aware that the status 
conference had been called when he received a copy of the notice 
that Arco's appeal had been dismissed based on failure of Arco or 
Arco's counsel to appear at the status conference. R.ll. 
21. Arco's counsel filed a Request for Reconsideration with 
the Utah State Tax Commission. R.10. 
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22. The request was unopposed by the Auditing Division. R. 8. 
23. The request was denied by the Tax Commission. R. 4. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Authority to default a Petitioner in a formal adjudicative 
proceeding is found in the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UCA 
§63-46b-ll(b)(1)). The statute requires two conditions to be met 
before such an extreme sanction can be imposed; (1) There must be 
proper notice of the formal evidentiary hearing, and (2) the 
Petitioner must receive such notice. The record in this case 
plainly demonstrates that neither condition was met in this case. 
Arco was defaulted for failing to appear at a "Status Confer-
ence". A "Status Conference" is not a "hearing" as that phrase is 
used in the UAPA. Furthermore, the "Notice" that was sent, of the 
"Status Conference", was not sent to the Petitioner. The mailing 
certificate of the "Notice" plainly state that rather than sending 
it to the Petitioner, it was sent to a former address of Peti-
tioner's counsel. It was sent there even though the Tax Commission 
knew the address was incorrect and that mail sent to that address 
had previously been returned as undeliverable. While the mailin 
certificate does purport the "Notice" was sent to the correct 
address of Petitioner's counsel, that factor is irrelevant. The 
plain language of the Statute clearly requires service on the 
Petitioner, not its counsel. 
In its Order denying the Petitioner's request for reconsidera-
tion, the Tax Commission does not find actual receipt of the 
"Notice" by either Petitioner or its counsel. Nor is such a finding 
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possible based on the record which the Tax Commission had to base 
its "Order" upon. The only evidence or argument presented clearly 
states that neither the Petitioner nor its counsel actually 
received the "Notice". Therefore, even if the plain language of the 
statute could be ignored and proper notice received by counsel for 
a petitioner could substitute for actual notice received by the 
Petitioner, there was no receipt nor any finding of the same by the 
Commission and the Order must be reversed. 
Alternate authority exists in the Utah Administrative Code 
whereby the Tax Commission may enter the Default of a party 
participating in formal adjudicative proceedings. Like the 
requirement in the UAPA, Rule 861-1A-1 (G) (1) (b) provides for a 
default where "[a] party to a formal adjudicative proceeding fails 
to attend or participate in a hearing". The Adminstative Code 
makes a clear distinction between a hearing, where default is 
allowed, and a conference. Rule 861-1A-1A(7) and Rule 861-1A-
1A(5) . Nowhere in the Administrative Code is there authorization 
for defaulting a Petition for failing to attend a conference. 
In light of the argument above, Petitioner was denied due 
process, through the dismissal of its properly made protest of the 
wrongful tax assessment. Where Petitioner met its duties under the 
statutes for having its protest heard, the termination of that 
right where notice was inadequate and where the statute and Rules 
governing the Tax Commission do not provide such an extreme 
punishment even if the Notice had been adequate. 
-8-
Those same arguments also show the acts of the Tax Commission 
were arbitrary and capricious. Under the facts of this case, the 
failure of Petitioner to attend or participate in a scheduling 
conference, where the Petitioner had absolutely nothing to add(all 
information necessary to resolve this case being within the sole 
control of the Tax Commission), does not justify the extreme result 
of the termination of Arco's Petition. While the termination of 
the Petition has major impact on Petitioner, the failure of 
Petitioner to attend the status conference in no way impacted the 
Tax Commission's ability to fully and fairly resolve the issues 
before it. The only contribution Petitioner could have made at the 
scheduling conference, would have been to say it had *not received 
formal notice of the resolution of the Pepcon case. This was 
something the Commission already knew. 
Neither the facts of this case nor the law support the 
sanction imposed by the Tax Commission. Therefore Petitioner 
respectfully request the Order dismissing the Petition be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE RECORD FAILS TO SUPPORT THE PURPORTED RATIONALE BEHIND 
THE TAX COMMISSION'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL. 
The rules governing the requirements for the default of a 
party participating in a formal administrative procedure are 
contained in Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-11. The portion of that 
statute specifically applicable to this action states: 
(1) The presiding officer may enter an order of default 
against a party if: 
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(b) A party to a formal adjudicative proceeding 
fails to attend or participate in a properly scheduled 
hearing, after receiving proper notice; 
(emphasis added). 
The governing statute clearly establishes a prerequisite of 
two things that must take place prior to a party being defaulted in 
a formal adjudicative proceeding. The first requirement is that 
the hearing be properly scheduled, while the second is that the 
party receive proper notice. The ruling of the Tax Commission 
ignores the requirement of actual receipt and instead focuses on 
the proper scheduling of the hearing. In its decision and Order, 
the Tax Commission stated: 
As for the Petition for Reconsideration concerning Appeal No. 
93-0237, Petitioner raises the issue of notice of the status 
conference which led to the dismissal. Petitioner points out 
that notice was not sent to the Petitioner. However, the 
Petitioner acknowledges that the notice was properly sent to 
the correct address of Petitioner's attorney of record. 
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, it is the decision and 
order of the Utah State Tax Commission, that the Petition for 
Reconsideration be denied. 
R.4. 
The Commission's decision and Order is flawed in three 
separate aspects. First, there is no finding that the Notice was 
actually received. Only that it was sent. Second, the Commission 
specifically found that Notice was not properly sent to Arco, but 
was, allegedly, properly sent to Arco's counsel. Third, there is 
absolutely no support in the record or anywhere else for the 
Commission's statement that Arco acknowledged "that the Notice was 
properly sent to the correct address of Arco's attorney of record 
in this matter." 
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The sole items of evidence, contained within the record, which 
the Commission could purportedly use to support its decision to 
sustain the default of the Petition in this matter are: (1) The 
Notice of Status Conference, dated August 6, 1996(R. 23), (2)the 
Order of Default, signed November 27, 1996 (R. 20), (3) the Request 
for Reconsideration, dated December 16, 1996 (R. 10) and (4) the 
response to Arco fs Request for Reconsideration, dated February 7, 
1997 (R. 8) . 
Of these items, the Response to Arco fs Request for Reconsid-
eration, is simply a two sentence statement by the Auditing 
Division that they had decided to decline to respond to the Request 
for Reconsideration. Other than showing that the Auditing Division 
had no objection to the request, this document provides no support 
or evidence for the Commission's decision to default Arco. 
The Notice of Status Conference gives evidence that a notice 
was prepared. The mailing certificate attached purports to claim 
that the Notice was sent to Arco at 660 South 200 East, Suite 301, 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111, which is not Arco's address, nor has it 
ever been. R. 23; R.ll. It further purports to stand for the 
proposition the Notice was mailed to Arco's counsel at his address 
at 4516 South 700 East, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, UT 84107. R.23. 
The original Order of Default establishes the fact that 
neither Arco nor its counsel appeared at the status conference, 
but otherwise provides no new information. R. 20. The final item, 
the Request for Reconsideration filed by Arco, does not provide any 
support for the Commission's decision. R. 10. 
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A. Default Was Improper Because the Notice of the Status 
Conference Was Not Received. 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) governs all 
administrative agency cases initiated after January 1, 1988. 
Dusty1s. Inc. v. Auditing Division of Utah State Tax Commission, 
842 P.2d 869, 870 (Utah 1992). The UAPA specifies the conditions 
under which an agency may enter the default of a participant in 
formal adjudicative proceedings. Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-
11(1) (b) . 
The plain language of the statute clearly requires both proper 
notice and receipt of notice prior to the entering of a default 
against a participant in formal adjudicative proceedings. See 
Nelsen v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995) (" . . . 
This Court is guided by the principle that a statute is generally 
construed according to its plain language.") The Decision and 
Order of the Tax Commission makes no finding that there was ever 
actual receipt of the Notice, only that the Notice was sent. R. 4. 
In its Decision and Order, the Tax Commission states, "Peti-
tioner points out that notice was not sent to the Petitioner. 
However, the Petitioner acknowledges that the Notice was properly 
sent to the correct address of Petitioner's attorney of record in 
this matter." R.5. There is absolutely no evidence in the record 
to support this finding. Indeed, the only reference made to these 
factors by Arco 's counsel, appears in the Request for Reconsidera-
tion. Beginning on Page 1 of the Request for Reconsideration, it 
states: 
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Neither Petitioner nor his counsel, received notice of the 
status conference. A check of the mailing certificate, lists 
the Petitioner's address as 660 South 200 East, Suite 301, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. That is not now, now has it ever 
been the address of the Petitioner . In fact, that address is 
the former address ' of Petitioner's counsel. Petitioner's 
counsel had notified the Commission and opposing counsel that 
he had moved from that location the 1st of December, 1995. The 
address set forth for the attorney for Petitioner is correct. 
Attorney for Petitioner has no idea what happened to the 
Petition sent to that address if the Petition was sent to that 
address as the mailing certificate claims. 
R. 11. 
Nowhere in this statement does Arco's counsel admit that the 
Notice was properly sent. Indeed, Arco's counsel's statement makes 
it clear he never received notice of the conference, nor did he 
know whether the Petition had been sent at all. Even were the 
Commission's findings correct, they would be irrelevant. U.C.A. 
§63-46b-ll (1) (b) requires-, by its plain language, that notice must 
be both sent and received by the party. The Utah Supreme Court has 
stated: 
We presume that the Legislature used each word advisedly and 
give effect to each term according to its ordinary and 
accepted meaning. We must be guided by the law as it is . . 
. when language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to 
mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction. 
Nelson v. Salt Lake County, at 875 (Citations omitted). See also 
MacKay v. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626, 630-631 (Utah 1995). 
If the Legislature wished to make notice effective upon 
mailing, it could have done so by setting forth the appropriate 
language in the Statute. See e.g. UCA §59-1-504. Instead, it chose 
to focus on actual receipt. 
The Tax Commission's failure to find actual receipt requires 
the Tax Commission's order be reversed. 
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B. The Tax Commission Did Not Send Proper Notice To Arco. 
Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-ll specifically requires that the 
party to the formal adjudicative proceeding must receive proper 
notice. 
The undisputed facts in this case establish that Arco did not 
receive notice. Indeed, the Tax Commission already knew that 
Petitioner was not at the address where the notice was sent. 
Addendum D pg. 3. Even if the Court were to accept the Tax 
Commission's unsupported finding that Arco's counsel received 
notice of the hearing, the statute specifically requires proper 
notice go to the party. Nothing in the Statute provides that 
notice to a party's counsel meets the requisite notice necessary in 
order for a default to be entered. 
The Notice of the Status Conference clearly set forth an 
improper address for Arco. The Auditing Division and the State Tax 
Commission had the correct address for Arco, and indeed performed 
the field audit at Arco's business. They also knew the address for 
Petitioner, where they sent the Notice of the Status Conference, 
was not correct. Addendum D pg. 3. 
The Tax Commission recognized the necessity of notifying Arco 
directly. That is why the Commission attempted to send the Notice 
to Arco. The Statute does not contain language allowing notice to 
counsel for a petitioner to substitute for actual notice sent to 
the petitioner itself. A Court may not insert substantive terms 
into statutory text which are not present. Webb v. Minow, 883 P.2d 
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13 65, 13 67 (Utah App. 1994) . The interpretation "must be based on 
the language used. . ." Berrett v. Purser and Edwards. 876 P.2d 
3 67, 3 70 (Utah 1994). The failure to send notice to Arco mandates 
the Tax Commission's ruling be reversed. 
II. THE TAX COMMISSIONS DISMISSAL OF ARCO'S PETITION WAS 
ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
A. Dismissal Of Arco's Action Is Unconstitutional. 
The State Constitution and the Constitution of the United 
States guarantee an individual due process of law.2 The dismissal 
of the Petition for Redetermination in this case constitutes a 
violation of that right to due process. The elements comprising 
the violations include the failure to comport with the notice 
requirements (see I. above) and the entry of default, where such 
action is not authorized by Rule or Statute, resulting in Arco 
being denied the opportunity to have its objections heard on their 
merits. 
Both the UAPA and the formally adopted Rules of the Utah State 
Tax Commission identify the specific instances where a Petition may 
be dismissed after a formal adjudicative proceeding has been 
commenced. 
The UAPA provides that a party to a formal adjudicative 
proceeding who fails to attend or participate in a properly 
scheduled "hearing" after receiving proper notice may be dismissed. 
Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-ll(1) (b) . 
2
 U.S. Const, amend. XIV Sec. 1; Utah Const. Art. I §7. 
-15-
The UAPA provides for the default of a party only when it 
fails to appear or participate in a hearing. The only hearing 
contemplated or identified in the UAPA in conjunction with a formal 
agency action is identified in U.C.A. §63-46b-8. This section 
defines the steps and requirements for the actual final dispositive 
hearing to determine the various issues set forth in the Peti-
tioner's Petition for Redetermination. Nowhere in the UAPA does 
it provide for a status conference, let alone providing for the 
default of a party who fails to attend one. 
The rules adopted by the Utah State Tax Commission likewise 
fail to provide that failure to attend a status conference is 
grounds for the entry of a default. 
The conditions allowing an administrative officer to default 
a petitioner are found in R861-1A-KG) (1) (b) . This rule provides 
that dismissal is appropriate where, "A party to a formal 
adjudicative proceeding fails to attend or participate in a 
hearing;". 
The word "hearing" is defined in Rule 861-1A-1 (A) (7) which 
provides ""hearings1 means a proceeding, formal or informal, at 
which the parties may present evidence and arguments to presiding 
officer in relation to a particular order or rule." The status 
conference in this case does not fulfill the role of a hearing. 
Indeed the rules of the Utah State Tax Commission provide a 
separate definition for this type of proceeding. The rules 
provide, ""conference1 means an informal meeting of a party or 
parties with division heads, officers, or employees designated by 
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division heads and informal meeting between parties to an 
adjudicative proceeding and a presiding officer." R861-1A-MA) (5) . 
Nothing in the rules of the State Tax Commission provides for 
a "default in the event of a failure to appear at a conference." 
There is no allegation made anywhere that Arco failed to attend or 
be represented at hearing. Only the status conference. 
Where neither the statutes nor the rules governing the agency 
in question provide authority for entering a default in a situation 
where a party fails to appear at a status conference, to dismiss 
Arco's Petition on such basis is a clear violation of its rights to 
due process. 
B. The Actions Of The Tax Commission In Dismissing The 
Petition Were Arbitrary and Capricious. 
Aside from the failure of the Tax Commission to follow its own 
rules, or the mandated statutes applying to all agencies, in 
dismissing the Petition in this matter, the facts of this case 
themselves show that the Commissioners' decision to enter a default 
in this case was arbitrary and capricious. 
The bad faith of the Tax Commission begins with the original 
assessments in this case. The two assessments made were based on 
alleged failures to receive sales tax. The first assessment was 
for not charging sales tax to tax exempt organizations such as the 
public schools and various churches for materials and services 
provided. That particular issue had already been decided in Arco's 
favor prior to the audit, and was on appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court at the behest of the Auditing Division. 
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Knowing assessment, on that basis, had already been declared 
improper, the Auditing Division made the assessment anyway, 
requiring the expenditure of attorney's fees and other costs in 
responding thereto. 
The second assessment was made based on the Arco' s not 
charging sales tax on materials and services provided in installing 
a fire alarm system at the Pepcon plant in Cedar City. Initially, 
Pepcon had provided a tax exempt certification and tax exempt 
number to Arco. Those documents later proved to be false. 
Thereafter, Pepcon pointed out that the sale and installation of 
materials was exempt from sales tax pursuant to a specific 
exemption provided by the Utah State Legislature. 
The Auditing Division assessed deficiencies against Arco and 
also asserted the same deficiencies against Pepcon who is the 
party, if any, who would have been responsible for paying the tax. 
Clearly this is not a case where there was any concern about 
the Tax Commission's ability to recover the amount of the defi-
ciency, if they were entitled to it, from Pepcon. This was simply 
an additional assessment for no particular purpose except to harass 
Arco. 
After the Petition for Redetermination was filed, the parties 
agreed to a stay of any further proceedings on either assessment 
until alternative proceedings dealing with the same or virtually 
identical issues were decided. Addendum C. 
The first matter was decided, in Arco's favor in Arco Electric 
Company v. the Utah State Tax Commission, 860 P.2d 330 (Utah 1993) . 
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This left only the issue of the Pepcon assessment. The Tax 
Commission was already pursuing Pepcon. Addendum C. The Tax 
Commission knew what the status of those proceedings were, but 
Arco had no way of getting any information on that subject. This 
matter sat for years before counsel for Arco heard a rumor that 
the Pepcon case had been resolved. Counsel for Arco then began 
seeking an acknowledgment that the matter had been decided and 
further sought to discover the result. 
Counsel for Arco was informed that the matter had resolved. 
If the representation is true that the Pepcon case was resolved 
prior to the dismissal of this action, the failure of the Tax 
Commission to inform Arco of that is an egregious act of bad 
faith. They are the sole entity in possession of the information 
that was necessary to either continue or finish this proceeding. 
Irrespective of the result rendered in the Pepcon matter, 
there could be no further deficiency owed by Arco. If Pepcon was 
successful in establishing that no sales tax should be paid, 
clearly there was no sales tax that had to be collected and the 
matter has to be dismissed. If Pepcon was unsuccessful in 
establishing that point, then clearly the Tax Commission has a 
right to collect that sum from Pepcon, and upon its payment this 
matter would be terminated. If there was a settlement arrangement 
entered into between Pepcon and the State Tax Commission, it would 
likewise dispense with this matter. Any such sums paid would 
resolve all taxes allegedly owing under the assessment. Otherwise, 
as the tax would be owed by Pepcon, with Arco merely acting as a 
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conduit to the Tax Commission, Arco would be entitled to recover 
any amounts it had to pay directly from Pepcon. Accordingly, any 
amount recovered would be a double recovery by the State Tax 
Commission. Rather than defaulting Arco, Arco's Petition should be 
granted, the assessment should be zeroed out and this matter 
dismissed on that basis. 
The Tax Commission's attempt to saddle Arco with this debt 
while already collecting the same from Pepcon is clearly arbitrary 
and capricious and the Order of Default should accordingly be 
vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
The default entered by the Tax Commission should be vacated. 
Default for failing to attend a status conference is not provided 
for or allowed under either the UAPA or the rules of the State Tax 
Commission. Furthermore, there is no competent evidence to support 
the findings of the State Tax Commission in entering its default in 
the first place. The failure to find actual receipt by Arco, is 
clearly fatal to this action in accordance with the plain language 
of the statute and rules in question. 
It would be manifestly unjust to allow the default of Arco to 
stand where Arco is not the one who owed the tax, if any was owed, 
but merely the party who was to collect it from the party owing it. 
This is particularly true when as here the State has already 
collected the taxes or found there are no taxes owing (depending on 
the outcome of the proceedings the Tax Commission had with Pepcon). 
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Arco respectfully requests this Court therefore vacate the 
Order of Default and remand this matter for further proceedings. 
Dated this / day of July, 1997. 
LARSON, KIRKHAM & TURNER 
BY ^ J '?— S 
Shawn D. Turner 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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I hereby certify that on the 7th day of July, 1997 I mailed 2 
copies of Appellant's Brief by prepaid first class mail to the 
following: 
Gale K. Francis 
Assistant Attorney General 
Jan Graham 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140874 
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ADDENDUM "A 
Appeal No. 93-0237 and 93-0337 
DECISION *>ND (TRDEK 
The Petition for Reconsideration on Appeal No. 93-0337 was 
not filed within the requisite period and therefore is denied on 
the grounds of untimeliness. As for the Petition for 
Reconsideration concerning Appeal No, 93-0237, Petitioner raises 
the issue of notice of the Status Conference which lead to the 
dismissal. Petitioner points out that notice was not sent to the 
Petitioner. However, the Petitioner acknowledges that the notice 
was properly sent to the correct address of Petitioner's attorney 
of record in this matter. Therefore, Based upon the foregoing, 
it is the decision and order of the Utah State Tax Commission 
that the Petition for 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
ARCO ELECTRIC, ) 
P e t i t i o n e r , } ORDER 
v . ) 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE ) Anoeal No. 93-0237 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, : " and 93-0337 
) Account No* G03 708 
Respondent. ) Tax Type: Sales & Use 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission upon a 
Petition for Reconsideration, dated December 10, 1996, filed by 
Petitioner as a result of the Commission's final decision dated 
January 4, 1996 for Appeal No. 93-0337 and final decision dated 
November 27, 1996 for Appeal No. 93-023 7. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
Utah Administrative Rule R861-1-5A(P) provides that a 
Petition for Reconsideration "will allege as grounds for 
reconsideration either a mistake in law or fact, or the discovery 
of new evidence." Under this rule, the Tax Commission may 
exercise its discretion in granting or denying a Petition for 
Recons ideration. 
C E R T I F I C A T E 0 ? M A I L I N G 
Utah State Tax Commission 
Appeal 
Arco E lec tr i c 
VS. 
Auditing Divis ion 
93-0337 
Arco Electric 
Petitioner 
660 South, 200 East, Ste. 301 
Salt Lake City DT 34111 
Turner, Shawn 0. 
Attoxney for Petitioner 
Larson, Kirkham & Turner 
4S1S South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City OT 34107 
Sandberg, Craig 
Respondent 
Director of Auditing 
210 North 1950 West 
Salt Lake City DT 34134 
Francis, Gale K-
Attorney for Petitioner 
ISO East 300 South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City DT 84144 
Clark, Dee 
Representative for Petitionei 
597 West 2900 South 
Sandy DT 84070 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing document 
addressed to each of the above named parties. 
^i-*n r\-
Date Appeals Staff {J 
Aooeal No. 93-0237 and 93-0337 
Reconsideration be denied- It is so ordered. 
DATED this ~~1 day of M^VT\0 1997. 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
UOTICS: You have thirty (30) days after the date of a final 
order to file a.) a Petition for Judicial Review in the Supreme 
Court, or b.) a Petition for Judicial Review by trial de novo in 
District Court. (Utah Administrative Rule R861-1A-5(P) and Utah 
Code Ann. §§59-1-501(1), 63-46b-13 ec. sea.) 
GSR*9*93-0237.ad 
ADDENDUM "B" 
ADDENDUM B 
Relevant Constitutional Provisions, Statutes & Rules 
U.S. Const. Amend XIV 
Section 1. 
All Persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Const. Art. I. § 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
U.C.A. §59-1-504. Time determination final 
The action of the commission on the taxpayer's petition for 
redetermination of deficiency shall be final 3 0 days after the 
date of mailing of the commission's notice of agency action. 
All tax, interest, and penalties are due 30 days from the date of 
mailing, unless the taxpayer seeks judicial review. 
As last amended by Chapter 161, Laws of Utah 1987. 
U.C.A. §63-46b-8. Procedures for formal adjudicative 
proceedings--Hearing procedure 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3 (d)(i) and 
(ii), in all formal adjudicative proceedings, a hearing shall be 
conducted as follows: 
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the course of the 
hearing to obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to afford 
all the parties reasonable opportunity to present their 
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positions. 
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a party, the 
presiding officer: 
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or 
unduly repetitious; 
(ii) shall exclude evidence privileged in the courts of Utah; 
(iii) may receive documentary evidence in the form of a copy 
or excerpt if the copy or excerpt contains all pertinent portions 
of the original document; 
(iv) may take official notice of any facts that could be 
judicially noticed under the Utah Rules of Evidence, of the 
record of other proceedings before the agency, and of technical 
or scientific facts within the agency's specialized knowledge. 
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely 
because it is hearsay. 
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the 
opportunity to present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-
examination, and submit rebuttal evidence. 
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not a party to the 
adjudicative proceeding the opportunity to present oral or 
written statements at the hearing. 
(f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if offered as 
evidence to be considered in reaching a decision on the merits, 
shall be given under oath. 
(g) The hearing shall be recorded at the agency's expense. 
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a person approved 
by the agency prepare a transcript of the hearing, subject to any 
restrictions that the agency is permitted by statute to impose to 
protect confidential information disclosed at the hearing. 
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties. 
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(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from 
taking appropriate measures necessary to preserve the integrity 
of the hearing. 
U.C.A. §63-46b-ll. Default 
(1) The presiding officer may enter an order of default 
against a party if: 
(a) a party in an informal adjudicative proceeding fails to 
participate in the adjudicative proceeding; 
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to 
attend or participate in a properly scheduled hearing after 
receiving proper notice; or 
(c) a respondent in a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to 
file a response under Section 63-46b-6. 
(2) An order of default shall include a statement of the 
grounds for default and shall be mailed to all parties. 
(3)(a) A defaulted party may seek to have the agency set aside 
the default order, and any order in the adjudicative proceeding 
issued subsequent to the default order, by following the 
procedures outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(b) A motion to set aside a default and any subsequent order 
shall be made to the presiding officer. 
(c) A defaulted party may seek agency review under Section 63-
46b-12, or reconsideration under Section 63-46b-13, only on the 
decision of the presiding officer on the motion to set aside the 
default. 
(4)(a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the agency, or 
in an adjudicative proceeding begun by a party that has other 
parties besides the party in default, the presiding officer 
shall, after issuing the order of default, conduct any further 
proceedings necessary to complete the adjudicative proceeding 
without the participation of the party in default and shall 
determine all issues in the adjudicative proceeding, including 
those affecting the defaulting party. 
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(b) In an adjudicative proceeding that has no parties other 
than the agency and the party in default, the presiding officer 
shall, after issuing the order of default, dismiss the 
proceeding. 
U.C.A. §63-46b-16. Judicial review--Formal adjudicative 
proceedings 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency action 
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(2)(a) To seek judicial review of final agency action 
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner 
shall file a petition for review of agency action with the 
appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate 
rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court 
shall govern all additional filings and proceedings in the 
appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's 
record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings are 
governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing 
transcripts and copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the 
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking 
judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the 
following: 
-4-
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the 
agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as 
applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by 
any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring 
resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or 
decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed 
procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally 
constituted as a decision-making body or were subject to 
disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, 
made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by 
statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the 
agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons 
that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; 
or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
As last amended by Chapter 72, Laws of Utah 1988. 
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Utah Admin. R. R861-1A-1. Administrative Procedures Pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. Section 59-1-210. 
A. Definitions as used in this rule: 
1. "Agency" means the Tax Commission of the state of Utah. 
2. "Agency head" means the Tax Commission of the state of 
Utah, or one or more tax commissioners. 
3. "Appeal" means appeal from an order of the Commission to an 
appropriate judicial authority. 
4. "Commission" means the Tax Commission of the state of Utah. 
5. "Conference" means an informal meeting of a party or 
parties with division heads, officers, or employees designated by 
division heads and informal meetings between parties to an 
adjudicative proceeding and a presiding officer. 
6. "Division" means any division of the Tax Commission, 
including but not restricted to the Auditing Division, Property 
Tax Division, Motor Vehicle Division, Motor Vehicle Business 
Administration Division, Data Processing Division, and the 
Operations Division. 
7. "Hearing" means a proceeding, formal or informal, at which 
the parties may present evidence and arguments to the presiding 
officer in relation to a particular order or rule. 
8. "Officer" means an employee of the Commission in a 
supervisory or responsible capacity. 
9. "Order" means the final disposition by the Commission of 
any particular controversy or factual matter presented to it for 
its determination. 
10. "Presiding officer" means one or more tax commissioners, 
administrative law judge, hearing officer, and other persons 
designated by the agency head to preside at hearings and 
adjudicative proceedings. 
11. "Quorum" means three or more members of the Commission. 
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12. "Record" means that body of documents, transcripts, 
recordings, and exhibits from a hearing submitted for review on 
appeal. 
13. "Rule" means an officially adopted Commission rule. 
14. "Rulemaking Power" means the Commission's power to adopt 
rules and to administer the laws relating to the numerous 
divisions. 
15. All definitions contained in the Administrative Procedures 
Act, Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-2 as amended, are hereby 
adopted and incorporated herein. 
Utah Admin. R. 861-1A-1. Administrative Procedures Pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. Section 59-1-210. 
G. Default. 
1. The presiding officer may enter an order of default against 
a party if: 
(a) a party in an informal adjudicative proceeding fails to 
participate in the adjudicative proceedings; 
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to 
attend or participate in a hearing; or 
(c) a respondent in a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to 
file a response within the time specified. Default, however, 
shall not be entered against the Commission or any division 
without a prior hearing on whether a default should be entered. 
2. The order shall include a statement of the grounds for 
default and shall be mailed to all parties. 
3. A defaulted party may seek to have the Commission set aside 
the default order according to procedures set forth in the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
4. After issuing the order of default, the presiding officer 
shall either dismiss the appeal or conduct any further 
proceedings necessary to complete the adjudicative proceeding 
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without the participation of the party in default and shall 
determine all issues in the adjudicative proceeding, including 
those affecting the defaulting party. 
Utah Admin. R. 861-1A-3. Division and Prehearing Conferences 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 59-1-210 and 63-46b-l. 
A. Division Conferences. Any party directly affected by a 
Commission action or contemplated action may request a conference 
with the supervisor or designated officer of the division 
involved in relation to such action. Such request may be either 
oral or written, and such conference will be conducted in an 
informal manner in an effort to clarify and narrow the issues and 
problems involved. The party requesting such conference will be 
notified of the result of the same, either orally or in writing, 
in person or through counsel, at the conclusion of such 
conference or within a reasonable time thereafter. Such 
conference may be held at any time prior to a hearing, whether or 
not a petition for such hearing, appeal, or other commencement of 
an adjudicative proceeding has been filed. 
B. Prehearing Conferences. In any matter pending before the 
Tax Commission, the presiding officer may, after prior written 
notice, require the parties to appear for a prehearing 
conference. Such prehearing conferences may be by telephone if 
the presiding officer determines that it will be more expeditious 
and will not adversely affect the rights of any party. Prehearing 
conferences will be for the purposes of encouraging settlement, 
clarifying the issues, simplifying the evidence, facilitating 
discovery, and expediting the proceedings. In furthering those 
purposes, the presiding officer may request that the parties make 
proffers of proof or written prehearing conference statements as 
to what they believe the evidence will show at the hearing. 
After hearing such proffers of proof and reviewing written 
statements, the presiding officer may then advise the parties how 
he views each side of the evidence and state how he believes the 
Commission may rule if evidence at the hearing is as proffered at 
the prehearing conference, and then invite the parties to see if 
a stipulation can be reached which would settle the matter. If a 
settlement is reached by way of stipulation, the presiding 
officer may sign and enter an order in the proceeding. If a 
settlement is not reached, the presiding officer shall enter an 
order on the prehearing conference which clarifies the issues, 
-8-
simplifies the evidence, facilitates and limits discovery, and 
expedites the proceedings to a reasonable extent. 
ADDENDUM "C" 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION V 
ARCO ELECTRIC, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
A 
PREHEARING ORDER 
Appeal Nos. 93-0237 and 93-0337 
Account Nos. G03708 and G02500 
Tax Type: Sales & Use Tax 
A prehearing conference was held in the above-entitled 
matters at 9:00 a.m. on November 23, 1993, Alan Hennebold, 
Administrative Law Judge, presiding. Shawn D. Turner, of Brown, 
Larson, Jenkins & Halliday, participated by telephone for Arco 
Electric. Gale Francis, Assistant Utah Attorney General, 
represented the Auditing Division. Craig Sandberg and Anna 
Anderson were also present for the Auditing Division. 
Based upon discussion among the parties and the ALJ, it 
is hereby ordered: 
1. The parties agree that these appeals may be resolved 
by the parties based upon the results of other appeals now pending 
before the Commission. With the consent of the parties, the 
prehearing conference in these matters is continued without date. 
2. While these appeals are held in abeyance, the parties 
may undertake discovery in an informal and cooperative manner. 
Appeal Nos. 93-0237 & 93-0337 
3 . The Appeals D iv i s i on w i l l n o t i f y Che p a r t i e s of any-
future proceedings . 
DATED t h i s Z'UK day of U o o g ^ W - , 1993. 
Alan Hennebold 
Administrative Law Judge 
P\93-O237.pho 
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Appeal Nos. 93-0237 and 93-0337 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Prehearing Order to the following: 
Arco Electric 
c/o Shawn D. Turner 
660 South 200 East, Ste 301 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Craig Sandberg 
Deputy Director, Auditing 
Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
Kim Thome 
Director, Auditing Division 
Heber M. Wells Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
Gale Francis 
Assistant Attorney General 
50 South Main Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
DATED this A ^ day of [)OWJAAX*/) 1993 
Seer 
ADDENDUM "D" 
BEFORE 1'IiE UTAH STATE TAX, COMMISSION 
ARCO ELECTRIC, 
E etitioner, 
v 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH STATE. TAX COMMISSION,. 
Respondent. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Appeal No 93-0337 
Accoi i 1:1 t: N ::) 
) Tax Type: Sales k Use 
$TATEfWT' OF CfrSS 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission 
. ... ,---_ione- s appeal The Status Conference was held on 
December 5, 13 5-., uuawa Turner representing Petitioner and Gale 
Francis representing Respondent. The parties indicated that all 
the Auditing Division has retracted all asse ..gainst 
petitioner for the period in question I n this appeal. The parties 
~3-.w^ «. v_**v*v- there are no remaining outstanding issues in this 
Appeal No. 93-0337 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission hereby 
orders that this matter be dismissed. 
DATED this H day of Qanfin^U , 1996 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
W. Val Oveson 
Chairman 
Jcfer' B. Pacheco 
Commissioner 
Roger 0. Tew 
Commissioner 
^Jui 
Shearer 
Commissioner 
'dstl^J 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of a final order 
to file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission. If you 
do not file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, you 
have thirty (30) days after the date of a final order to file a.) 
a Petition for Judicial Review in the Supreme Court, or b.) a 
Petition for Judicial Review by trial de novo in district court. 
(Utah Administrative Rule R861-1A-5(P) and Utah Code Ann. §§59-1-
601(1), 63-46b-13 et. seq.) 
sy934337od 
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/ # * % * • - State of Utah 
lommission 
50 West 
Itah 84134 
Forwarding and Address 
Correction Requested 
H t n * J J 
TAX C MMM )M 
. • M 
17M ^  A<^$S 
C E R T I F I C A T E O F M A I L I N G 
Utah State Tax Commission 
Appeal 
Arco E l e c t r i c 
VS. 
Auditing Division 
93-0337 
Arco Electric 
Petitioner 
660 South 200 East, Ste. 301 
Salt Lake City DT 84111 
Turner/ Shawn D. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Brown, Larson, Jenkins & Halliday 
660 South 200 East, Ste. 301 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Thorne, Kim 
Respondent 
Director of Auditing 
210 North 1950 West 
Salt Lake City UT 84134 
Francis, Gale K. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
50 South Main #900 
Salt Lake City UT 84144 
Clark, Dee 
Representative for Petitioner 
597 West 2900 South 
Sandy UT 84070 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing document 
addressed to each of the above named parties. 
Appeals 
